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Conscientious Refusal and Access to Abortion and Contraception 
By Chloë FitzGerald and Carolyn McLeod 
 
 
Conscientious refusal in health care refers to refusals by health care professionals to 
provide (or not to provide) certain health care services.  The most widely cited examples 
involve physicians and nurses who refuse to perform or assist with the performance of an 
abortion and pharmacists who refuse to dispense contraceptives.  The topic of 
conscientious refusal in bioethics is closely tied to debates about access to abortion and 
contraception and about how we conceive of the role of health care professionals and 
their obligations to their patients. 
Abortion and contraception raise issues of conscience among health care 
professionals because strong religious or moral beliefs that concern the legitimacy of 
these services are common.  Prime examples are beliefs about the status of fetuses and 
embryos, women’s reproductive freedom, and the purpose of procreation.  There are 
opposing views on these issues that can polarize societies, despite the fact that abortion 
and contraception are legally available in most of the developed world and often covered 
by state-funded health provision. 
Although conscientious refusals to provide abortions or contraception are more 
well-known, conscientious refusals not to provide these services have also occurred. In 
other words, some health care professionals insist on offering abortion or contraceptive 
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services even when they are prohibited, because not doing so violates their conscience. 
James Childress mentions the example of physicians who secretly provided information 
on contraception to couples in Connecticut when there was still an anti-contraceptive law 
in vigor, an action he calls “evasive noncompliance” (Childress 1985, 68-9; see also 
Harris 2012).  Which professionals make conscientious refusals on an issue depends to 
some extent on the legal status quo. In the current situation, where abortion and 
contraception are typically legal and form part of the standard services provided by health 
care professionals, conscientious refusals that concern abortion or contraception will be 
refusals to provide (rather than not provide) services.  We focus predominantly on these 
refusals.   
In section 1, we provide more details on the nature of conscientious refusal in 
health care and discuss how refusal impinges on access to abortion and contraception.  
We approach the considerable, while qualified, support for this phenomenon by 
bioethicists in section 2.  We express worries in section 3 about certain aspects of this 
support and the view of conscience on which much of it is based.  Finally, section 4 
explores the implications of alternative conceptions of conscience—those that we have 
each proposed elsewhere—for the bioethics education of health care professionals.  Our 
focus here is on education about patient access to abortion and contraception.  Our 
general position on conscientious refusal, which informs our discussion throughout, is 
that accommodation for conscience in health care can be appropriate.  But such a policy 
must be grounded in a more nuanced view about conscience than what we tend to see in 
the bioethics literature; and it must take seriously the political nature of conscientious 
refusals and their likely impact on women’s access to abortion and contraception.  
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1. Conscientious refusal: the phenomenon and its impact 
The phenomenon of conscientious refusal by health care professionals is complicated by 
the variety of kinds of services that the refusals can target and by how the phenomenon 
differs from paradigm cases of conscientious objection.  We cover these issues first and 
then turn to what is known about the impact of conscientious refusals on access by 
patients to abortion and contraceptive services.  
Depending on the kind of professional involved (doctor, nurse or pharmacist), 
conscientious refusal that concerns abortion or contraception can be a refusal to do the 
following: perform an abortion; prescribe or dispense contraception, emergency or 
otherwise; prescribe or dispense contraception to a particular group (e.g., unmarried 
women); refer a patient to another professional for abortion or contraceptive services; 
provide information on abortion or contraception; train to perform abortions and related 
procedures; stock contraception (i.e., in one’s pharmacy); or simply participate in any 
way in the provision of these services.  Conscientious refusal can therefore target a range 
of services, from providing patients with a particular service to offering them information 
about it.   
However, conscientious refusal is directed not only at a certain health care service 
(or set of services), but also at the expectation that the relevant professional will provide 
the required service.  This expectation comes from professional norms or policies, or 
from legal rules. Normally, the objector does not refuse a direct order by an authority to 
meet the relevant expectation; and in this way, conscientious objection in health care 
differs from the tradition of conscientious objection by pacifists to comply with the 
military draft.  What many objectors in health care refuse to do is accede to a request by a 
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patient, who may hold an expectation of care, but who neither issues an order nor has 
authority over the objector.  As a result, relevant authorities (e.g., the health care 
professional’s college or professional association) will not know about an objector’s 
refusal unless the patient complains about it or the objector makes her objection public. 
To be sure, some conscientious objectors in health care are like pacifist objectors in that 
they refuse to comply with a direct order by an authority (e.g., an order by a physician to 
a nurse); however, many enjoy too much autonomy in their practice for that to be true.    
Conscientious refusals in health care can go unnoticed not only by authorities, but 
also by patients themselves, particularly if health care professionals are not clear about 
why they will not fulfill patients’ requests.  Thus, because of how very private they can 
be, the frequency of conscientious refusals in health care is unknown.  However, their 
impact on others can be substantial.  Unlike a citizen refusing the military draft whose 
action has at most a statistical effect on the numbers fighting for a nation, a conscientious 
refusal in health care typically has direct effects on patients, some of which can be severe 
(e.g., unwanted pregnancy).  Moreover, when conscientious refusals in health care target 
abortion or contraceptive services, women are disproportionately affected.   
Although the numbers of conscientious refusals by health professionals are 
difficult to measure, they seem to be significant enough to create serious obstacles to 
access to abortion or contraception in some places.  In the United States, for example, the 
political and legal prominence of the issue (many health care professionals in the U.S. 
have a legal right to conscientious refusal; Charo 2007; Downie 2012; Dykes 2002) and 
the media attention it attracts (Dale 2004; Editorial 2007; Stein 2006, 2008, 2012) 
suggest that the frequency of conscientious refusals is quite high.  The issue is growing in 
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political importance in other countries, including Canada (Downie & Nassar 2008; 
Rodgers & Downie 2006), the U.K. (Deans 2013; Laurance 2007), Spain (Sánchez 
Esparza 2012), South Africa (van Bogaert 2002) and Italy (Palma 2012).  There have 
been reports in some of these countries of serious restrictions, even ‘black-outs,’ to 
abortion access because of conscientious refusals.  (See Cannold 1994 for an example 
from Australia.)  The potential for conscientious refusals to limit access to abortion 
severely is a reality in some parts of the world. 
Conscientious refusal in health care is intimately tied to the political and moral 
debate about abortion, especially in the U.S.  There, the right of health care professionals 
to issue such refusals was not a topic of serious debate until the Supreme Court 
decriminalized certain kinds of abortion in Roe v. Wade (Stein 2012).  Nonetheless, some 
bioethicists approach the issue as though it had little to no connection to the politics of 
abortion.  We criticize this tendency in the next section.  
2. Support for conscientious refusal in health care 
There is broad support in the bioethics literature for the claim that health care 
professionals have a right (or at least should be permitted) to refuse conscientiously to 
provide services; however, this support is not unqualified.  In this section, we outline the 
different qualifications that bioethicists defend to this right.  We also discuss the method 
that some of them use to defend their moderate endorsement of conscientious refusals. 
The majority of bioethicists who have commented on conscientious refusal take a 
moderate stance: that is, one that permits refusal but at the same time restricts it. The 
limitations on refusal that bioethicists defend concern the kinds of refusals that health 
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care professionals can make, when they can make them (e.g., not in emergencies), and 
possibly how they do so (Benjamin 1995; Blustein 1993; Brock 2008; Card 2011; Charo 
2007; Childress 1997; Deans 2013; Fenton & Lomasky 2005; LaFollette & LaFollette 
2007; Lynch 2008; McLeod 2010; Meyers & Woods 2007; Wicclair 2000, 2011). Julian 
Savulescu is somewhat unusual in his extreme view that health care professionals (he 
focuses on physicians) have no right to conscientious objection, although they could 
permissibly make objections that do not compromise “the quality, efficiency, or equitable 
delivery of a service” (2006: 296; see also Kelleher 2010 and Kolers forthcoming).  
According to Savulescu, physicians are responsible for providing all “legal and beneficial 
care,” and their conscience should not interfere with them doing so (296).  
Different limitations on what is permitted distinguish different versions of the 
moderate position on conscientious refusal in health care.  The following is a non-
exhaustive list of moderate views that appear in the literature.  A conscientious refusal is 
permissible if and only if:  
• The objector is willing to make a timely referral to a professional who will 
perform the relevant service (Cantor & Baum 2004; Charo 2007).  
• The objector is able to show that her objection is genuine—that it stems from a 
sincerely held moral or religious belief (Benjamin 1995; Lynch 2008; Meyers & 
Woods 1996). 
• The refusal respects the “core values” of the profession (Deans 2013; Wicclair 
2000, 2011).  
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• The objector has registered her refusal with her licensing board, which is an 
institution that should be charged with ensuring that patients get the services they 
need (Lynch 2008). 
• The objector works in an area in which the patient could easily get the service 
somewhere else close by (Fenton & Lomasky 2005). 
Most authors also argue that to be morally permissible, a conscientious refusal cannot 
explicitly discriminate against a minority social group (e.g., be racist), nor can it occur in 
an emergency situation.  
Most of the above restrictions do not preclude health care professionals from 
refusing in many contexts to perform abortions or to prescribe or dispense contraception. 
More generally, many bioethicists have taken positions that, while qualified, do not 
prevent them from endorsing or allowing much conscientious refusal in health care. 
Overall, support among bioethicists for conscientious refusal is considerable.  We point 
this out, not because we believe that conscientious refusal should be banned necessarily, 
but because we worry about the implications that such support has for women’s freedom 
to access abortion or contraception.  As noted above, conscientious refusals can have a 
substantial negative impact on women’s ability to obtain these services.  
Granted, support from bioethicists tends to be weaker for pharmacists who object 
to emergency contraception, compared with physicians who refuse to perform abortions.  
Pharmacists who object to emergency contraception (EC) often do so because they 
believe that EC is an abortifacient and is, as a consequence, morally wrong.  Such 
refusals by pharmacists are typically grounded in empirical beliefs about the mechanisms 
of action of EC that are questionable at best, which helps to explain why bioethicists have 
	8 
 
little sympathy for them.  In general, refusals to prescribe emergency contraception are 
heavily criticized in the literature (e.g., Card 2011; Greenberger & Vogelstein 2005; 
Kelleher 2010).  
In defending moderate positions on conscientious refusal, bioethicists often 
employ extreme examples unrelated to abortion and contraception that most of us, 
regardless of our views on abortion, would agree are highly morally desirable or morally 
undesirable. Bioethicists use the former type—the morally desirable refusal—to help 
motivate the view that conscience is worth protecting among health care professionals.  
For instance, if a physician who was working under the Nazi regime in Germany 
conscientiously refused to be involved in the killing of Jews, he would reveal the kind of 
conscience most of us would want to protect in health care (McLeod 2008: 37).  
Bioethicists use cases at the opposite extreme—that is, of refusals that almost 
anyone would consider morally abhorrent—to show that limits on conscientious refusal 
in health care are essential, even when the refusals are based on sincere moral convictions.  
Mark Wicclair invents the example of a physician who has a deeply held moral belief that 
pain is a sign of a moral flaw and therefore should be endured.  This physician 
conscientiously refuses to prescribe medication for pain (2000: 216). Dan Brock imagines 
a white physician who sincerely believes that racial mixing is morally wrong and thus 
conscientiously refuses to treat black patients (2008: 190).  Both of these examples are of 
conscientious refusals that are clearly unacceptable.  Because of cases like them, 
conscientious refusal, or protection for it, cannot be unlimited in health care.  
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It is worthwhile considering extreme examples of conscientious refusal that are 
removed from the debate over access to abortion and contraception; they can allow one to 
develop a universal analysis of conscientious refusal and can also provide clues about the 
moral dimensions of refusals to provide abortion and contraceptive services.  However, 
too much focus on these cases and not enough on those that involve abortion, 
contraception, or the like (e.g., sterilization) is problematic for two reasons.  First, it 
leaves us with theories that do not say enough about whether or when the latter are 
morally justified, given what is special about them: for instance, the significant impact 
they can have on women’s reproductive freedom.  Second, it simply misrepresents the 
phenomenon of conscientious refusal in health care (at least within the U.S.), which arose 
in the midst of heated debate about abortion and is still embedded to some degree in this 
political context.  Conscientious refusal is tied—in health care, not in the military—
generally speaking with right-wing political agendas and opposition to them, particularly 
agendas that favor the traditional family and women’s place within it.  Portraying the 
phenomenon as though it either did not have this connection or was politically neutral is 
misleading.   
3. Further Criticisms of the Literature  
We see at least two additional problems with the literature on conscientious refusal: 1) it 
is often too one-sided, focusing more on the potential harm to conscientious objectors if 
forced to violate their conscience than on the consequences for patients if they do not 
have access to treatment; and 2) much of the literature is grounded in a view about 
conscience that is unpersuasive.  Let us discuss each of these issues in turn. 
McLeod (2010) highlights an instance of the first problem when she argues that 
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bioethicists have failed to think clearly about the negative consequences women (or girls) 
are likely to face when conscientious objectors deny them access to EC.  In her view, 
these consequences amount to more than mere inconvenience, which is how some 
bioethicists assess them (e.g., Fenton & Lomasky 2005). It is more likely that women will 
be harmed rather than merely inconvenienced by a conscientious refusal of EC, according 
to McLeod, even when they could get the drug at another pharmacy close by.  She 
explains how in circumstances where the drug is widely available, conscientious refusals 
to provide EC can still interfere with women’s interests: more specifically with “their 
autonomy in obtaining EC …, their moral identity (as a good or fine person), and [their] 
sense of security” (i.e., security in knowing that their society respects their ability to 
decide what happens to their own bodies) (19, 20).  Women’s reproductive autonomy is 
at stake because a refusal can be so emotionally difficult that a woman stops trying to get 
EC and decides to take her chances with getting pregnant (see also Kelleher 2010, 302).  
Such outcomes are dependent, according to McLeod, on the socio-political context in 
which conscientious objections to EC occur.  Currently this context is one in which 
negative social stereotypes influence what it means for women to request EC and for 
someone to deny such requests on moral grounds.  The relevant stereotypes include “that 
women who are sexually promiscuous are of low character—they are ‘sluts’ or 
‘whores’—and [that] women, more so than men, who have unprotected sex are 
‘irresponsible’ or ‘careless’” (18, citing Stubblefield 1996). 
Because of this oppressive social context, women tend already to be vulnerable 
when they seek EC. Their social position puts them at serious risk of harm when 
pharmacists or other health care professionals refuse them access to EC.  Even if a 
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woman who has this experience manages to continue her search for the drug and obtain it 
from another pharmacy, the refusal at the first pharmacy can be damaging to her (e.g., to 
her bodily security).  Moreover, regardless of how the refusal is made, it can be harmful.  
The pharmacist could be as kind and caring as possible when stating his moral objection 
and yet still make the woman feel horrible, in part because one can only do so much to 
deflect the negative social meanings of one’s actions.   
Overall, McLeod’s argument reminds us that bioethicists need to probe in detail 
what the effects of conscientious objections to abortion and contraception are on women 
within the societies in which they live: that is, societies that are sexist, racist, and in other 
ways morally non-ideal.  If McLeod is correct about what these consequences are like, 
then the feminist struggle to ensure that women have access to abortion and contraception 
continues even where these services are legal and readily available, so long as there is 
some conscientious refusal.  
 The second problem we see with the literature on conscientious refusal is that it 
tends to rely on a particular understanding of conscience and why conscience is worth 
protecting that is flawed.  What McLeod calls the ‘dominant view’ of conscience in 
bioethics is explicitly defended by Martin Benjamin, Jeffrey Blustein, James Childress 
and Mark Wicclair. (McLeod 2012: 161-181; Benjamin 1995; Blustein 1993; Childress 
1979, 1997; Wicclair 2000, 2006).  These authors associate the value of conscience (or of 
listening to one’s conscience) with having moral integrity, and turn, define moral 
integrity in terms of psychological unity, or more specifically, unity between one’s moral 
principles and commitments and one’s actions. The violation of integrity, so understood, 
is harmful, according to this view, 
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We see three problems with the conception of conscience just described:  
1. It prioritizes the preservation of psychological unity over the development of 
an individual's moral values.  
2. It provides no incentive for an agent to rethink her moral values, encouraging 
a view of conscience as fixed.  
3. It focuses exclusively on the explicit attitudes of conscientious objectors, 
neglecting the implicit attitudes that can also influence their behavior and thus 
lead them to violate their conscience. 
The first concern lies with what the dominant view takes to be wrong with denying 
professionals the right to conscientious refusal.  The idea is that if a health care 
professional cannot abide by her conscience, she loses psychological unity (i.e., integrity).  
And this is bad for two reasons: 1) unity is part of what constitutes a good life (Blustein 
1993; Benjamin 1995: 470); and 2) desire to repair “inner division” is an admirable 
characteristic of persons (Blustein 1993: 297). 
However, it is not clear that the function and value of conscience lie in protecting 
psychological unity.  Obeying one’s conscience and going against the grain of social 
norms under considerable social pressure can make people feel less, rather than more, 
psychologically unified.  McLeod describes an example (based on the real case of Lois 
Jenson) of a woman who listens to her conscience telling her to stand up for herself and 
press charges in the face of debilitating sexual harassment at work.  Because the woman 
receives little support in her endeavor and instead faces a worsening situation and 
mounting social pressure, she begins to doubt that she has done the right thing in listening 
	13 
 
to her conscience.  She loses confidence in her perspective and starts to loathe herself.  In 
sum, she loses rather than gains psychological unity as a result of listening to her 
conscience (McLeod, 2012). 
McLeod’s feminist relational perspective on conscience and consequent 
consideration of scenarios in which the protagonist is part of an oppressed group help to 
highlight the disunity that conscience can bring.  However, the point can be made even if 
we limit ourselves to more traditional examples of powerful men in positions of privilege.  
Literature, film and popular myth are replete with examples of heroes who struggle with 
their conscience.  Moreover, obeying conscience is often depicted in these narratives as a 
process that makes one feel less psychologically unified.  For instance, the Thomas More 
of the 1966 film, A Man for All Seasons, remains true to his religious and moral values 
and refuses to swear the oath required by law because it challenges the Pope’s power; yet 
he doubts and struggles with himself in the process, particularly in the face of the 
suffering his decision inflicts on those dear to him.  Granted, he might enjoy some 
psychological unity when he finally faces execution for his beliefs, at which point he 
appears to be at peace with himself.  But even assuming that is true, obtaining such unity 
was not More’s aim in following his conscience, nor does it capture what we value most 
in his actions.  Rather, we appreciate the fact that he struggles to work out what he values 
and to do the right thing by his own lights.  On this view, conscience is valuable precisely 
because it prevents us from blindly following whatever the social norms of the day 
dictate and encourages us to make our own moral choices (McLeod, 2012; Fitzgerald, 
forthcoming).  
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A second and related problem with the dominant view about conscience in 
bioethics is that its insistence on psychological unity does not encourage rethinking the 
values that one upholds through one’s conscience; instead it tends to present conscience 
as the reinforcement of a fixed set of values.  For example, Mark Wicclair refers to the 
“core ethical values” involved in conscience that are “integral” to a person’s “self-
conception or identity”, as if these values did not change over time (2000: 214). Although 
Wicclair and other proponents of the dominant view do not explicitly say that conscience 
involves a fixed set of values, we suspect that this idea is lurking behind their conceptions 
of conscience and it is evident in the way that they discuss examples.  There is rarely 
mention of the possibility of an individual's conscience developing and changing, nor of 
cases where the voice of one’s conscience is in fact a recalcitrant emotion stemming from 
past values that one has disowned.  For instance, a theatre-goer raised in a strict Puritan 
household may experience pangs of guilt when going to the theatre as an adult, even if he 
completely rejects the Puritan values of his upbringing (example originally from John 
Rawls, 1972: 482; employed in the context of recalcitrant emotions by Brady 2007: 274).  
Psychologically complex cases such as these highlight the dangers of conceiving of 
conscience as the reinforcement of fixed values.	
The notion that the values of conscience are fixed goes hand-in-hand with the idea 
that conscience protects psychological unity.  Once one has a set of values that are 
unified, whatever those values might be, conscience will continue to reinforce them in 
order to preserve psychological unity, if that is the correct function of conscience.  But 
there is no incentive here for the agent to change her values or rethink her conscience.  
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This outcome is deeply problematic because there may be values influencing a person’s 
conscience that she no longer endorses and perhaps has never endorsed.   
The final problem is that the prevailing view ignores implicit attitudes, which may 
influence objectors’ explicit attitudes about the services they find offensive.  There is a 
wealth of empirical evidence showing that much of our behavior is influenced by implicit 
attitudes that are not under our direct rational control and that may even conflict with our 
explicit attitudes (Jost et al. 2009; Nosek & Riskind 2012).  The Harvard Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) is widely used by social psychologists to measure implicit 
attitudes.  Subjects are asked to match negatively and positively valenced words with, for 
example, black faces and white faces, at such a speed that conscious reflection is not 
involved in the task.  Most white subjects and many black subjects who are tested 
connect negatively valenced words with black faces more quickly than they do with 
white faces.  This is taken as an indication of an implicit, non-conscious association 
between negative evaluations and black people, amounting to a pro-white bias.  Most 
who are found to exemplify an implicit pro-white bias hold explicit anti-racist views and 
are thus horrified to learn about their implicit attitudes.  Biases related to a variety of 
factors, such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, age, nationality and sexual 
orientation have been tested in populations from all over the world and their widespread 
presence confirmed (Jost et al. 2009).   
Importantly, these biases have been shown to influence behavior outside the 
laboratory (Jost et al. 2009; Nosek & Riskind 2012).  Researchers have recently 
investigated implicit biases among health care professionals and shown how they affect 
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patient care.  A landmark study of this kind indicated a negative correlation between the 
level of implicit pro-white bias exhibited by white physicians and the probability that 
they would recommend an effective treatment option (thrombolysis) to a black patient 
(Green et al. 2007).  Another study showed that clinicians with higher levels of implicit 
pro-white bias, compared to those with lower levels, delivered a poorer quality of care 
and clinical communication to black patients (Cooper et al. 2012).  (For further studies, 
see Sabin & Greenwald 2012 and von Hippel et al. 2008.)  The results of this research are 
disturbing because they prove that even if a physician is explicitly and sincerely 
committed to being non-prejudiced towards her patients, she may still harbor implicit 
biases and give poor treatment to marginalized patients as a result.  
Underlying the dominant view of conscience is the problematic assumption that 
only explicit beliefs influence behavior and are thus relevant to conscience.  This view 
presents conscience as a mode of consciousness that examines whether past or future 
behaviour accords with an individual’s moral values, yet only mentions actions that an 
agent plans explicitly (Benjamin 1995; Blustein 1993; Childress 1979, 1997; Wicclair 
2000, 2006).  However, we know that implicit attitudes also influence behavior, behavior 
that can contravene an agent’s values without her awareness.  We know, for example, 
that some physicians unwittingly go against values they cherish by treating black patients 
differently from white patients. 
Consider that a conscientious objector to abortion or contraception could 
genuinely believe that he objects to the service for non-sexist reasons; but he actually 
harbors implicit biases against women that influence his desire to object.  Some feminists 
have worried that sexism lies behind some conscientious objection (e.g., Anderson 2005).  
	17 
 
The data on implicit bias operating under the radar of conscious thought makes this a 
more likely phenomenon.  Of course, just because beliefs are explicit does not mean that 
they are a better justification for conscientious objection; but an objector is at least able to 
cite the explicit beliefs that lead him to object and to hold them up to scrutiny.  The worry 
is that implicit attitudes of which he is unaware (and would not endorse if he were aware 
of them) could be influencing a health care professional's decision to conscientiously 
object.  We argue that important work on implicit attitudes and their contribution to 
decisions and behavior needs to be acknowledged and integrated into a realistic 
conception of conscience. 
In this section, we have made two broad claims. First, the support by bioethicists 
for conscientious refusal in health care tends to focus too much on the potential harm to 
objectors and fails to appreciate the seriousness of the consequences these refusals may 
have for patients, particularly when they concern female patients’ access to abortion and 
contraception.  The remedy for this problem is fairly obvious: bioethicists need to 
consider the socio-political context in which refusals take place and supplement their 
theorizing with data from the terrain that reveal the effects refusals have on access to 
abortion and contraception.  Second, there are three main flaws in the dominant view of 
conscience that informs much of the discussion in bioethics about the moral 
permissibility of conscientious refusals.  In the final section, we briefly discuss the 
implications for health professional education of a revised conception of conscience—
one that we believe is immune to the three worries we have raised with the dominant 
view.  
4. Promoting a ‘well-functioning conscience’ through health professional education 
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Given the impact that conscientious refusal has on access to abortion and contraception, it 
is reasonable to ask health care professionals for something in return for the right to 
conscientiously refuse services.  In our view, this something should be participation in 
educational workshops that encourage the development of “a well-functioning conscience” 
(a concept we explain below) and promote understanding of the ethics of abortion, 
contraception, and conscientious refusal.  
Our discussion in the previous section indicated that there is more involved in 
having a well-functioning conscience than the bioethics literature suggests.  On our view, 
a well-functioning conscience is one that effectively flags occasions where an individual 
is behaving, has behaved, or is about to behave in a way that goes against her moral 
commitments, whether this behavior is the result of an explicitly planned action or of 
implicit attitudes (Fitzgerald forthcoming).  People with a well-functioning conscience 
have an awareness of their implicit biases and work to mitigate or avoid manifesting them, 
especially biases that conflict with their explicit moral or religious views.  They will also 
revise their explicit attitudes when given good reason to do so and in response to 
inconsistencies internal to them and between them and their behavior.  Such individuals 
will not maintain psychological unity at all costs and thus their conscience is not fixed; 
rather, it is open to revision based on what the individual endorses.  The work of 
cultivating such a conscience is best done with the help and input of others rather than in 
isolation (FitzGerald forthcoming; McLeod 2012).  Others can help us to see when 
implicit attitudes shape our behavior, when we have good reason to revise our 
commitments, and when our commitments and behavior are inconsistent.  At least some 
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of this work could be done with colleagues in a workshop setting and simply through 
encouraging professionals to reflect on their behavior. 
On our view, health care professionals whose conscience is well-functioning with 
respect to the issues of abortion and contraception should have some understanding of 
how conscientious refusals to provide these services can affect women.  This will involve 
having some sense of why these services are important to women who seek them out.  
Assuming this view is correct, ethics education for health professionals that covers 
abortion and contraception could help health care professionals improve the functioning 
of their conscience. This is not to say that those health care professionals who 
conscientiously object to abortion or contraception necessarily have badly-functioning 
consciences, only to argue that any right to have one's conscience protected should be 
accompanied by a duty to ensure the cultivation of a well-functioning conscience.  
In terms of training health care professionals to develop a well- (or better-) 
functioning conscience with respect to abortion and contraception, educators could 
employ the existing method of reflective practice.  Reflective practice encourages health 
professionals to reflect critically on their professional experience and learn from this 
reflection; it helps them to integrate professional values with their personal beliefs; and it 
promotes self-awareness (Mann et al. 2007: 596).  The practice involves teaching 
methods such as small group discussions, keeping private journals or portfolios, and 
developing a relationship with a mentor, which are all well suited to approaching 
sensitive and delicate topics. In one educational intervention, organizers held workshops 
for medical students that involved role-plays on conscientious refusal in reproductive 
health care.  Students’ responses indicated that the workshops were helpful for them, 
	20 
 
allowing them time to reflect on their own views, become more comfortable discussing 
them, and consider how to communicate a refusal to a patient (Lupi et al. 2009).   
To target the specific threat that implicit attitudes pose to the well-functioning of 
a health professional’s conscience, workshops designed to raise awareness of the dangers 
of implicit bias could be combined with reflective practice methods.  Jeff Stone and 
Gordon Moskowitz (2011) provide recommendations on how to create such workshops.  
Organizers could invite health professionals to test their own implicit biases with tools 
such as the IAT, although the tests should be carried out in a supportive environment and 
the results should remain strictly confidential.  The IAT in particular should be seen as a 
teaching tool rather than an exam that one must pass.  Workshops could include methods 
of identifying implicit biases, along with advice on how to mitigate these biases or avoid 
their manifestation.  Of course, great care should be taken with the way in which advice 
is proffered because there is a danger of provoking hostile and counter-productive 
reactions.  Which techniques are most likely to be successful at reducing the 
manifestation of implicit bias remains a somewhat open question; empirical research in 
this area is at a very early stage and caution is needed.  For instance, there is mixed 
evidence on whether intentional control has positive or negative effects on the 
manifestation of implicit stereotypes (Stewart & Payne 2008: 1333).  However, indirect 
methods of control seem more effective, and there is evidence that the following in 
particular may be helpful: focusing on one’s past failures in the area of 
bias/discrimination before an encounter and thus activating the goal of ‘being egalitarian’ 
(Moskowitz & Li 2011); holding in mind counter-stereotypical exemplars, such as a 
successful black person (Blair 2002: 248-9); and mentally rehearsing ‘implementation 
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intentions’, tied to specific environmental cues, such as ‘When I see a black person, I will 
think “successful”’ (Stewart & Payne 2008).    
There is some indication that health professionals would welcome learning more 
about implicit attitudes.  In the study cited in the previous section in which physicians 
with pro-white implicit bias tended to suggest thrombolysis less often as a treatment for 
black patients, 75% of the participants said that taking the IAT is a worthwhile 
experience for physicians, and 76% agreed with the statement that learning more about 
unconscious biases could improve the quality of their patient care (Green et al. 2007: 
1235).  This evidence shows at least that health professionals would not necessarily be 
hostile to learning about the influence that implicit attitudes may have on their practice.  
Concluding Remarks 
In summary, conscientious refusal in health care is closely connected to political and 
moral debates over abortion and contraception.  It can, and in some places does, have a 
significant impact on access to these services.  The majority of bioethicists support the 
ability of health professionals to conscientiously refuse to provide abortion or 
contraceptive services within certain limits; most of them restrict permissible refusals to 
those that are not based on discriminatory beliefs, that do not occur in an emergency 
situation, and that satisfy other criteria as well.  Such views tend not to preclude much 
conscientious refusal, however.  On the whole, the bioethics literature is quite supportive 
of conscientious refusal in health care.  
We have objected to the bioethics literature on conscientious refusal because, in 
general, it focuses too much on harm to health care professionals and too little on harm to 
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patients, and because much of it employs a conception of conscience that is problematic.  
Although we agree that health care professionals should probably be able to make 
conscientious refusals in some circumstances, we also think that they should be duty-
bound to cultivate a well-functioning conscience.  We have outlined a revised conception 
of conscience that explains what a well-functioning conscience would look like and that 
has implications for the ethics education of health care professionals.  Our 
recommendations for education included using reflective practice that is centered on the 
specific topics of abortion, contraception and conscientious refusal, and that encourages 
health care professionals to maintain or develop a well-functioning conscience.  Specific 
training in implicit attitudes is also vital, in our opinion, to ensure that these professionals 
are aware of the danger of behaving in ways that are contrary to their explicit beliefs. 
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